INTRODUCTION
Confederate batteries opened up on Fort Sumter in April of 1861, inaugurating the bloodiest conflict in American history. 1 President Abraham Lincoln's war effort, nursing wounds from defeats at Fredericksburg in 1862 and Chancellorsville in 1863, sorely needed more men and supplies. 2 Propaganda campaigns and conscription efforts filled gaps in the depleted ranks of Lincoln's army, helping it swell into the largest mobilization of troops in the world. 3 Reliable supplies were, however, harder to come by; while Union soldiers fell to Confederate bullets and bayonets on the battlefield, army commissaries and quartermasters fell victims to fraud. 4 
A lack of
The FCA operates as a powerful tool to combat fraud that, otherwise left unchecked, might imperil the federal government's finances. The FCA allows either the Attorney General or a qui tam whistleblower (known in the FCA context as a relator) to bring an action on behalf of the United States against persons or entities committing certain types of fraud against the government.
21
The FCA, codified at 31 U.S.C. § 3729, holds that any individual who "knowingly" presents or knowingly conspires to "present[], or cause[] to be presented, a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval" or "makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or statement material to a false . . . claim" is liable under the FCA, which imposes damages up to $11,000 per violation in addition to treble the amount of the In essence, the FCA prohibits the submission of false claims for payment where federal funds are involved."). 16 Id. (citing JOHN T. BOESE, CIVIL FALSE CLAIMS AND QUI TAM ACTIONS § § 1.01-1.04 (3d ed. 2006)). 17 
Id.
18 See Rhoad et al., supra note 15, at 15. 21 "Qui tam" means "for the government as well as the plaintiff," Qui Tam, LAW DICTIONARY, http://dictionary.law.com/default.aspx?selected=1709 (last visited Jan. 8, 2016). Or, more literally, it means "qui tam pro domino rege quam pro se ipso, or who pursues this action on our Lord the King's behalf as well as his own." Rhoad et al., supra note 15, at n.13 (citing Vermont Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 769 n.1 (2000)) (internal quotations omitted). 
22
This can result in cases where the damages could total a staggering $2 billion. 23 The FCA, as a tool of fraud deterrence and of compliance enforcement, has had the most significant effect on the healthcare industry. 24 By way of illustration, between 1986 and 2009, two-thirds of the $22 billion recovered by the federal government ($14.3 billion) came from recoveries in the healthcare industry. 25 Since 2009, however, differing interpretations of the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act ("FERA"), 26 the passage of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act ("ACA"), and the Supreme Court's unanimous decision in Universal Health Services, Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar have all expanded the scope of the FCA, leading new industries to find themselves increasingly in the crosshairs of expanded procedural theories of liability. 27 At an operative level, the FCA posits that both "factually false" and "legally false" claims are actionable; "factually false" claims include goods or services either incorrectly described or not provided at all, 28 and "legally false" claims are false based on statements, promises, or other certifications of compliance. 29 While various circuits have held that the FCA reaches factually false conduct, legal falsity (with the Supreme Court's recent endorsement) could gain traction as an equally important theory for prosecuting fraud. 30 This expanded theory of liability may continue to 22 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A)-(B) (2012) . 23 One such industry falling under this broad purview is higher education. This Note will address whether or not educational institutions in the for-profit sector should be held liable under the FCA for entering into a Program Participant Agreement ("PPA") with the government, in good faith, only to thereafter commit fraud. This Note contends that the modern higher education environment provides an appropriate context in which courts may permissibly disregard any distinction between conditions of participation and conditions of payment for purposes of imposing FCA liability. It further posits that the Supreme Court's Escobar decision, though an important landmark toward a broader enforcement tool, did not go far enough to deter fraud in higher education. Part I will describe the background of the FCA, the rationale for the development of the "legally false" theory of liability, and the differences between the express and implied types of certification. It will also discuss judicial interpretation of legal falsity, with emphasis on the Supreme Court's decision in Escobar. Part II will address conditions of participation and conditions of payment and why the difference may remain significant in the fraud context. Part III will explain the structure of for-profit educational institutions, their role as government contractors, and the nature of the circuit split regarding the receipt of Higher Education Act ("HEA") Title IV funds and FCA liability. Part IV will discuss policy implications of this "implied certification of post-formation performance" 32 theory and why the educational setting is the appropriate venue in which to hold government contractors liable for fraud on an expansive sub-theory of implied false certification.
GlaxoSmithKline to Plead Guilty and Pay $3 Billion to Resolve Fraud Allegations and Failure to Report

PART I
Any civil claim seeking relief must cogently articulate the nature of the grievance in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
33
To establish a prima facie case of an FCA violation, a plaintiff is held to a heightened pleading Amendments to the FCA have created a more robust tool for whistleblowers and the government alike to disincentivize fraudulent actors."); see generally Martin, supra note 20; Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 1989 Ct. , 2004 Ct. (2016 The FCA's role as a fraud-prevention statute allows relators-usually private individuals with knowledge of fraudulent practices committed by a government contractor-to bring an action on behalf of the government.
36
A relator must allege that a defendant presented false or fraudulent claims 37 for payment to an entity of the U.S. government, did so "knowing" 38 that the practice was illegal, and that the claim was material to the government's decision to issue payment. 39 Having successfully navigated this statutory minefield, a relator's allegations may still be dismissed for failure to state a claim. 40 Further complicating matters for an FCA plaintiff is the fact that the law is largely the product of judicial development and, as such, is in a constant state of flux. In an eight to zero decision, the Court held that implied false certification was a valid theory of liability under the FCA.
51
The FCA imposes liability for fraudulent claims submitted under one of two categories: factually false and legally false.
52
As mentioned previously, factually false claims are misrepresentations of goods or services provided, whereas legally false claims involve false certifications of compliance with terms of a statute or regulation where compliance is a precondition to payment. 53 Legally false claims are, again, subdivided into two principal categories: express false certifications and implied false certifications. 54 The latter, implied false certifications, can be further subdivided into two additional categories: "implied certification of no pre-formation fraud in the inducement and implied certification of post-formation compliance with contract terms, statutes [,] or regulations."
55
Express false certifications, which are beyond the scope of this Note, occur when a government contractor explicitly and fraudulently certifies compliance with rules, statutes, or regulations governing the financial relationship between the parties.
56
Implied false certifications are broader than express false certifications because liability may be imposed when a claim is submitted to the government for payment without disclosing violations of conditions on which continuing eligibility to receive payment is predicated-essentially attaching liability to knowing silence.
57
The more nuanced variations of implied false certifications, pre-formation fraud, and post-formation fraud will be taken up in greater detail in Parts III and IV, infra. The first court to recognize the existence of legal falsity, for purposes of the FCA, was the U.S. Court of Federal Claims in 1994. 58 In this case, the Army Corps of Engineers retained Ab-Tech Construction, Inc. to construct an automated data processing facility.
59
A grand jury investigation into Ab-Tech's business affairs found that the president of the company had engaged in the fraudulent submission of progress payment vouchers; the Court of Federal Claims thereafter determined that, in submitting these vouchers, Ab-Tech impliedly certified ongoing compliance with the terms of the contract.
60
Citing Neifert-White, the court held that Ab-Tech's withholding of information regarding its noncompliance while continuing to submit invoices for reimbursement was "the essence of a false claim."
61
Since Ab-Tech, other courts have approached the theory of legal falsity expressing varying degrees of acceptance.
62
The controversy over the scope of FCA liability, under a theory of legal falsity, had continued to divide the circuit courts even two decades after Ab-Tech, requiring the Supreme Court to step in to resolve the conflict.
63
In Universal Health Services, Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, the Supreme Court considered whether a healthcare entity, whose improperly licensed providers caused the death of a teenage girl, could be held liable under the FCA.
64
Universal Health Services submitted claims for payment to Medicaid, which contained boilerplate language certifying compliance with practitioner licensing requirements. 65 The services listed on the claims (e.g., counseling sessions and prescribing medications) were, in fact, provided, but they were not done in conformity with the implicit terms of the 58 The falsity in the claims, therefore, was not express, it was implied. In the absence of a clear statutory definition, the Court turned to the common law origin of the word "fraud" to determine whether Congress intended the FCA to capture a wide range of duplicitous contracting practices. 67 The Court ruled in the affirmative, contending that, under the common law, omissions were treated as a type of fraud; the Court further determined that neither the FCA nor the common law "tether[ed]" liability for fraud to violations of conditions of payment.
68
But the Court's rejection of this talismanic liability label did not totally destroy the distinction between conditions of payment and conditions of participation.
69
In the end, the Court found the implied false certification theory valid, at least "in some circumstances." 70 It outlined a two-part, conjunctive test: first, the claim submitted by the contractor must articulate "specific representations about the goods or services provided" and, second, must fail to mention its noncompliance with governmental requirements, the nondisclosure of which transforms the submitted claim into a "half-truth."
71
Initial reactions to Escobar point out that the Court's affirmation of legal falsity is far from a ringing endorsement of the implied false certification theory.
72
Whatever the case, it is still too early to assess industry fallout. One thing does, however, remain clear: while courts readily recognized express false certification as a tenable theory under the FCA prior to Escobar, adoption of implied false 66 Id. at 1998. 67 Id. at 1999 (quoting Sekhar v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2720, 2724 (2013)). 68 Id. at 2001. 69 See id. at 2003 ("[W]hen evaluating materiality under the False Claims Act, the Government's decision to expressly identify a provision as a condition of payment is relevant . . . ."). 70 Id. at 1999. 71 Id. certification as a theory of liability was, historically, less well received. 73 And the Court's lukewarm approbation for the theory may do little to erode decades of circuit division. 74 Since the advent of the Pandora's Box ruling in Ab-Tech, courts, commentators, and the American Bar Association, among others, have lobbied against painting with too broad of a brush in the healthcare context. 75 This practice will be addressed in greater detail in Parts III and IV, infra. There is, however, a silver lining for these dissenters: while the Escobar Court may have green-lighted a broader theory of liability, the Court seems to have done so on the narrowest grounds; 76 it retained the distinction (albeit a diluted version) between conditions of participation and conditions of payment in addition to retaining a "rigorous" materiality standard for proof of fraud. the Supreme Court's decision in Escobar will hardly be the last word on the matter. 80 The legacy of the FCA, from here forward, is for the lower courts to mold.
One industry that would benefit from a more expansive view of the FCA is higher education. The split between the Seventh and Ninth Circuits (Sanford-Brown and Hendow, respectively) 81 is illustrative of the larger debate over the propriety of adopting an expanded theory of implied false certification in the higher education context. To understand why higher education is, in the opinion of this author, a more appropriate realm for meting out liability under a broader theory of implied false certification than the type the Court endorsed in Escobar, it is necessary to review conditions of participation and conditions of payment in the FCA context.
PART II
One of the bedrock principles of the FCA is restitution.
82
The FCA operates by recouping monies wrongly paid to noncompliant government contractors and imposes treble damages as an additional measure of deterrence against future fraud. 
84
In this way, the ultimate result of a case hinged on whether the reviewing court would treat the violated provision in question as a condition of participation or a condition of payment.
85
The
88
The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services ("Medicare"), furthermore, explain in their Program Integrity Manual that conditions of participation are different from conditions of payment.
89
Put simply, if the government has a range of administrative remedies by which to address the alleged violation, then the provision is likely a condition of participation. 85 Lauer et al., supra note 75. 86 Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 2001 ("We conclude that the [FCA] does not impose this limit on liability . . . . Nor does the common-law meaning of fraud tether liability to violating an express condition of payment."). 87 Id. at 2003 ("In sum, when evaluating materiality under the False Claims Act, the Government's decision to expressly identify a provision as a condition of payment is relevant, but not automatically dispositive." (emphasis added)). 88 See id.; see also Mikes, 274 F.3d at 697 ("Accordingly, while the Act is intended to reach all types of fraud without qualification that might result in financial loss to the Government, it does not encompass those instances of regulatory noncompliance that are irrelevant to the government's disbursement decisions." (citing United States v. Neifert-White Co., 390 U.S. 228, 232 (1968) (internal quotations omitted))). 
91
In deciding whether the submission of an annual cost report to Medicare constituted a violation of a condition of payment or condition of participation under an implied false certification theory, the Third Circuit's Conner v. Salina Regional Health Center decision relied on the "detailed administrative mechanism" established by the government; 92 the court held that because this mechanism was in place, the allegedly violated provision was a condition of participation.
93
Illustrative of other courts ruling on this issue, the Conner court noted that an adequate remedial system established by Medicare could address mere regulatory violations that did not rise to the level of fraud. 94 Thus, the court reasoned, it would make no sense to transform every condition of participation violation (for which there already existed a built-in administrative remedy) into a condition of payment violation that could be actionable under the FCA. 93 Id. 94 Id. 95 Id. ("There is thus no basis in either law or logic to adopt an express false certification theory that turns every violation of a Medicare regulation into the subject of an FCA qui tam suit."). 96 Id. at 1220. that could herald the transformation of conditions of participation into conditions of payment; commentators and courts fear that this could precipitate the usurpation of administrative agencies by federal courts as the premier arbiters of regulatory and contractual compliance.
102
While this dystopian scenario-where all, or most, conditions of participation suddenly become conditions of payment-is contrary to the majoritarian view, it is not wholly improbable, especially given the appropriate legislative nudge. 103 Medicare's implementation of "Value-Based Purchasing," which ties payment to quality of care standards, may blur the former division between conditions of payment and conditions of participation. 104 Though perhaps relevant only in the healthcare context, the government's willingness to deemphasize web.htm (articulating why the alleged violation need not be a violation of a precondition for payment to be actionable under the FCA, effectively blurring the distinction between conditions of payment and conditions of participation). 
PART III
In 2016-2017, the average four-year in-state tuition across the United States was $9,650 for public schools, $16,000 for for-profit schools, and $33,480 for private schools-this represented an average increase of 2.4% from the 2015-2016 school year's tuitions and fees. 107 Combine these higher tuition rates with increased college enrollment, to the tune of 20.2 million students in the fall of 2015 (an increase in enrollment of 4.9 million students from fall 2000) and it is clear to see the important role that higher education plays in our economy.
108
Many students who are unable to afford the sticker price of tuition and associated fees may apply for federal aid through loans, grants, or federal work-study; some 70% of students receive grants to help them pay for college. Ct. 1989 Ct. , 1994 Ct. (2016 ("What matters is not the label the Government attaches to a requirement, but whether the defendant knowingly violated a requirement that the defendant knows is material to the Government's payment decision."). 106 The Mikes court deferred to Congress and Medicare to resolve its FCA-related institutional competence concerns, discussed in Part IV, infra; Medicare's willingness to blend the two previously discrete concepts (conditions of participation and conditions of payment), combined with Congressional desire to expand the FCA (manifested in the 2009 FERA amendments) and the Supreme Court's most recent stance warrants revisiting the reasoning and conclusion of Mikes.
107 TRENDS IN COLLEGE PRICING 2016, COLLEGEBOARD 9 (2016), https://trends.collegeboard.org/sites/ default/files/2016-trends-college-pricing-web_0.pdf. 108 Through federal aid programs, students apply for financial assistance from the federal government and use the money to pay the costs of tuition for the duration of their enrollment; under this scheme, for-profit institutions that have signed a PPA can receive up to 90% of gross tuition from federal sources alone.
112
For-profit colleges, 113 colloquially known as "career colleges," have been around for over 100 years.
114
These institutions were originally designed to meet increasing demand for specialized technical and vocational needs in particular labor markets; 115 the for-profit business model advocated fast-tracking a degree-seeking individual to ensure prompt graduation with the skills essential for immediate job placement.
116
In fact, many students in the past decade were promised that exact 111 34 C.F.R. § 668.14(a)(1) (2015) (emphasis added). § 668.14(b)(16) ("[T]he institution will derive at least 10 percent of its revenues for each fiscal year from sources other than Title IV, HEA program funds . . . or be subject to sanctions.").
113 While any institution of higher learning could commit the type of fraud actionable under a theory of post-formation implied false certification, recent cases seem to focus on the fraud and abuse committed by for-profit schools. For the sake of brevity, this Note does not take up a discussion of the differences between for-profit colleges, public/private colleges, and community colleges, but assumes that the analysis would be similar-to wit, any institution of higher education that violates provisions of a PPA could be prosecuted under the theory of post-formation implied false certification. But, fast-forward to January 2016: prosecution for fraud forced Corinthian Colleges, one of the largest for-profit institutions, to declare bankruptcy and shut down all campuses while 7,500 former students of Corinthian and other forprofits signed petitions urging the federal government to forgive the more than $164 million in loans that they were duped into taking.
118
A 2008-2009 investigation by the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions revealed that forprofit colleges raked in $32 billion despite the fact that more than half of the students enrolled during that same time did not have a job.
119
In an environment replete with such potential for fraud, the Ninth Circuit found that it was appropriate to impose FCA liability on a for-profit institution based on a theory of express false certification. In Sanford-Brown, the Seventh Circuit looked at the PPA and "panoply of statutory, regulatory, and contractual requirements" that the institution had agreed to abide by as preconditions to the receipt of federal funding.
126
The court rebuffed the notion that compliance with the PPA was both a condition of participation and a condition of payment.
127
The court thus affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant and dismissed "all" allegations of FCA liability.
128
Because Sanford-Brown did not have a fraudulent mindset when it signed the PPA, the court reasoned, all subsequent claims for payment were not "poisoned 122 Id. at 1172 n.1 ("Here, we need not address the viability of this theory, because it is beyond dispute that the University signed the written [PPA], thus making an express statement of compliance."). 123 The Hendow court, over the objections of the defendant University, waved away concerns that the incentive compensation ban was a condition of participation rather than a condition of payment, saying "in this case, that is a distinction without a difference." Id. at 1176. The court also held that the University was liable under the FCA under a legally false theory-express false certification. Id. at 1172 n.1. In so holding, the Hendow court did two things: it imposed post-formation liability for claims that were legally false, id. at 1175 (which belongs to the same sub-species of claims as implied false certifications), and also demonstrated willingness to treat conditions of participation and conditions of payment equally in the education context, which is an essential step (and one that has caused some of the greatest friction), see, e.g., United States ex rel. Mikes v. Straus, 274 F.3d 687, 700 (2d Cir. 2001), toward adopting the theory of post-formation implied false certification. 124 The Seventh Circuit attempted to seize upon five carelessly drafted words contained in the Hendow court's introductory remarks-"in order to become eligible," Hendow, 461 F.3d at 1169-to rest the laurels of its no post-formation fraud argument. United States v. Sanford-Brown, Ltd., 788 F.3d 696, 710 (7th Cir. 2015). The Seventh Circuit was satisfied that this phrase, uttered once in a 5,000 word opinion, was enough to justify its finding that post-formation implied false certification is not a tenable theory of FCA liability in the education context. The fallacy of this position is self-evident; the Hendow court never again mentioned the fact that relators alleged the existence of fraud in the inducement and, even if the relators did so allege, the Hendow court's ultimate holding (that FCA liability can attach under a theory of post-formation express false certification) illustrates that this allegation would have been immaterial to the decision, regardless. but an institution's decision to commit fraud after goodfaith entry into a PPA is not actionable under the FCA theory of post-formation implied false certification. Sanford-Brown, therefore, stands for the proposition that:
[P]romises of future performance do not become "false" due to subsequent noncompliance. . . . " [a] university that accepts federal funds that are contingent on following a regulation, which it then violates, has broken a contract." This distinction between fraud at the outset and breach of contract after entry into a PPA is significant . . . . 133 Whether false claims submitted after signing a PPA are punishable under the FCA is not an issue that can be resolved by dismissively categorizing such claims as mere breaches of contract, pace the Seventh Circuit. The Main and Sanford-Brown courts, nevertheless, end their inquiry at this stage, maintaining that the answer is "straightforward."
134
But the inquiry is not so binary. Because legal falsity, and, more specifically, implied false certification, enjoys both legislative and judicial sanction, 135 public policy seems to militate against narrowly construing it in the 129 Id. The Main and Sanford-Brown courts, therefore, seem to be on the wrong side of both logic and policy.
138
PART IV
It has been over twenty years since Congress condemned the rampant fraud and abuse in federal aid programs and urged for greater oversight to protect students. 139 In the same time frame, the amount of student loans has increased ten-fold.
140
With more loans, more students are saddled with ever-greater amounts of debt, to the extent that student debt now accounts for more of the national debt than any other singular category of creditor debt in the United States (more than mortgages, motor vehicle loans, and credit cards, to name a few).
141
Aggregate student debt, according 1999 (2016) ("We first hold that, at least in certain circumstances, the implied false certification theory can be a basis for liability."). 136 The Supreme Court did not expressly outline the industry applicability of their holding in Escobar, but previous courts' reluctance to apply FCA liability theories equally across various, distinct industries would seem to indicate that the Supreme Court's restraint in this respect was intentional. The Court's decision ostensibly applies to the healthcare context where the submitted claim form is expressly false on its face (see Summary and Significance, supra note 74), but beyond this realm, its guidance would seem to lose some of its prescriptive potency. 137 See, e.g., Deming et al., supra note 114, at 140-41 ("Students leave for-profit colleges with higher levels of debt than students from other types of institutions and are more likely to default on their student loans . . . . Students who attended for-profit colleges are more likely to be unemployed and have lower earnings once they leave school than those in community colleges and other nonselective institutions."); see also Bidwell, supra note 118; Cohen, supra note 117; Picchi, supra note 118. 37 (1991) , http://files.eric.ed.gov/ fulltext/ED332631.pdf ("The Department of Education must develop ways to assist those students who continue to be victimized by fraud and abuse within the GSLP. Because the Department's oversight systems have failed, students who have not received the education promised have been left responsible for loans that they cannot repay and, therefore, on which they all too often default."). 
142
The uncontrolled growth of student debt seriously impairs students' subsequent financial endeavors "such as purchasing homes, starting families, investing in small businesses, or retiring from the workforce." 143 Beyond this, increasingly higher delinquency rates among students 144 (which economists identify as being at least partially responsible for the 2008-2009 financial crash) suggest a strong causal mechanism for an overall "macroeconomic drag" on the national economy. 145 This has the inevitable domino effect of disincentivizing later investments for former students like home ownership or business startups. 146 Student debt, in this way, is like a cancer: because nothing has been able to stem its unregulated growth, its continued proliferation could cause systemic problems affecting not just indebted college graduates and dropouts, but the nation as a whole. 147 From a public policy standpoint, therefore, the importance of prosecuting fraud to protect these students cannot be overstated. 148 It is the opinion of this author that, despite the existing administrative infrastructure, the judiciary is an appropriate supplemental enforcement mechanism in the higher education context. 149 The FCA should be used by courts to ferret out and punish "all fraudulent attempts [,] " regardless of how the breaches are categorized. 150 The Supreme Court, therefore, should have resolved the circuit split by embracing a broader version of the implied false certification theory in Escobar. The Mikes court, often cited as the seminal case on the theory of implied certification, 154 cautioned against reading the theory "out of context." 155 Though the court is quite reticent on precisely what context(s) is/are appropriate for the application of the implied false certification theory, it does offer that at least one context is less appropriate: healthcare. 156 The healthcare context is believed to be an inappropriate realm for broadened FCA liability because, in part, "Medicare regulations are among the most completely impenetrable texts within human difference because the Court already sanctioned broadening the scope of the FCA with a resounding eight to zero decision. where even the most diligent healthcare entity could become ensnared by an arcane condition of participation and thereby be on the hook for $11,000 per violation, plus triple the amount of the government's losses. 158 This situation would result in the inevitable federalization of medical malpractice, which, as the court notes, would contravene considerations of federalism.
159
Broadening FCA liability in the healthcare context, furthermore, is not contemplative of judicial economy, 160 would be detrimental for healthcare providers, 161 and would be generally contrary to public policy. 162 The Mikes court also invoked an institutional competence argument in justifying its refusal to hold Pulmonary and Critical Care Associates liable for uncalibrated spirometers under a theory of implied false certification. 163 By claiming that courts are an improper venue to adjudicate whether violations of some Medicare standards trigger FCA liability, the Mikes court invited Congress or the relevant administrative agency (in that case, Medicare) to act if there was disagreement over the court's interpretation. 164 In 2009, Congress did act-it promulgated FERA and expanded the FCA by requiring a materiality element. 159 Mikes, 274 F.3d at 700. 160 Id. (highlighting the fact that creating broader liability provisions exposes healthcare providers to FCA claims for relatively innocuous violations-for example, using a rubber-stamped signature in place of a hand-written signature); see also Lauer et al., supra note 75. 161 Fabrikant & Solomon, supra note 28, at 114 (regarding "the principle that men must turn square corners when they deal with the government[: t]he square corners rule applies fully in the context of the FCA. In the context of the heavily regulated health care field, however, the application of the FCA to compliance certifications threatens to create so many corners for health care providers that the corners turn into circles." (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Fed. Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 385 (1947))). 162 Intuition, alone, indicates that hospitals should not be answerable to FCA violations on mere regulatory snafus: given that hospitals tend to care for the elderly, the disadvantaged, and the chronically ill, imposing hefty federal fines for lesser violations is plainly contrary to the public policy of promoting the social good that these institutions carry out. Although institutions of higher education, like for-profit schools, do serve the financially disadvantaged, their work is qualitatively different from that of healthcare providers. 163 Mikes, 274 F.3d at 700. 164 Id. this legislative alteration to the FCA cast a wider net to prosecute fraud. 167 Escobar, the most recent chapter in the ongoing saga of the evolving FCA, went further by sanctioning implied false certification. 168 But, because the issue before the Court was a violation of a Medicaid requirement, the Court was limited to circumstances arising in the healthcare context. 169 As such, the Court did not reach the propriety of an implied false certification of post-formation performance theory to prosecute for-profit institutions abusing federal aid programs. Even still, the Court's decision did not go far enough: preventing and punishing fraud, through a robust liability theory, is imperative in industries contracting with the government for economic, social justice, and public policy reasons.
170
The Court's endorsement of implied false certification, though an important step toward creating broader applicability for the FCA, is little more than a "pyrrhic" victory for achieving broader liability coverage.
171
In the higher education realm, the Court's ruling does not entirely foreclose the viability of the post-formation implied false certification theory, though its two-part test 172 does impose significant limitations on the theory. 173 It appears that these limitations will impermissibly shift the balance of power in FCA lawsuits by disadvantaging relators and students while giving significant leverage to educational institutions. In the interest of reining in abuses in the for-profit education sector, circuits interpreting the Court's recent guidance should broadly interpret Escobar's normative directive. 166 Mikes, 274 F.3d at 697 ("We need not and do not address whether the Act contains a separate materiality requirement."). 167 Cf. Rhoad et al., supra note 15.
168 United Health Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 1989 , 1999 . 169 Id. at 2001. Even limited to this context, it is this author's contention that the holding is still too narrow. 170 From a public policy standpoint, this may increase burdens on courts as more relators are able to survive motions to dismiss and summary judgment in the pleading stage; the Court, however, rejected contentions from Universal Health Services that requiring a fact-intensive evidentiary standard would impose too great a burden on courts. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 2004 n.6. From a social justice standpoint, an expanded implied false certification theory of liability under the FCA could be effective in protecting students in the higher education context where they are often in positions of unequal bargaining power. 
